



The Aliyev Dossier



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Preface

This dossier is probably a result of Aliyev's recent book publication „Godfather-In-Law“. The authors of this essay decided to publish a text quite different to the above mentioned book, because ETG's impression of R. Aliyev is in total contrast to the picture, he is trying to paint in his publication: Dr. Aliyev is not the reformer of Kazakh society and the political system he claims to be.

Since 2006, even as Ambassador to Austria and the International Organizations in Vienna, Aliyev tried to silence down ETG, after we published details of his criminal „Black Raider“ system. This year, Aliyev tries to sue us before a German court, mainly because we re-published newspaper articles regarding his case on our web site.

Although the reader could get the impression, that this publication is a kind of private war against Aliyev and his system, this is not true. The main reason for this publication is to show the Western public, how a criminal mind from Kazakhstan, more or less successfully, is playing a role as a reformer and democratic head of Kazakh society and politics here in the West and how Western authorities, mainly the intelligence branch, is using him for their own benefit.

ETG is well aware of the fact that an extradition to Kazakhstan and a new trial against him would not be the right decision, in fact a court in Kazakhstan would not act objective and independent. The Austrian law in fact gives the opportunity to put him on trial in Vienna, investigating independently the accusations against him. This would be a realistic opportunity for speaking justice, for the victims and the family members of them, who still don't know whether their relatives are still alive or not.

For this publication, ETG used its information sources inside Kazakhstan, mainly our correspondents, but also official documents that are reliable, and witnesses, who know the Aliyev system very well. ETG also used its contacts and information sources from governments and authorities in Austria, China, Russia, the United States and United Kingdom, in order to complete the picture.











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ETG's experienced and multidisciplinary team is committed to provide policy makers with relevant strategic analysis.


The efforts of ETG depend on the contributions of governments, corporations and private individuals to fund its activities.

Biography

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 1996: The end of the career as a small businessman, moving to the Civil Service; appointed First Deputy Chief of the Tax Police, in addition Chief of the Anti-Corruption and Smuggling Department of the State Tax Committee
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 1997: Establishing his network; control over the Department of Tax Police at the Ministry for Internal Affairs; forming of a „secret department“ to monitor the most successful companies in Kazakhstan
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 1998: State revenues as his personal property; turning the Tax Police into an independent body of economic power in the country
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 1999: Appointed Head of the KNB in Almaty and its region in the rank of a Major General; uncontrolled influence over the political, economic and social life in Kazakhstan
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 2000: Within the KNB, Aliyev is creating a special paramilitary unit, consisting of more than 700 fighters with war experience from Chechnya and Afghanistan; purchase of weapons from Israeli companies for US\$ 50 million; through the media in Kazakhstan he is starting to build-up the image as a democratic reformer and fighter against corruption and crime
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 2001: Beside the control over KNB, Financial Police and Customs Service, Aliyev takes over the control over KAZAtomProm, Sugar Centre, Nurbank, Mangistaumunaygaz, media like Khabar, Kazakhstan-1, STC, CTC, ORT-Kazakhstan, Europa Plus KAZ, Hit-FM-Khabar, Retro-Karavan, Russian Radio, Karavan, New Generation, Kazakhstan Today
- 
 2002: Appointed Ambassador of Kazakhstan to Austria; he uses his diplomatic opportunities for the restoration of his political credibility; starting to bring „personal savings“ from Kazakhstan to the West, e.g. is acquiring Austrian property for € 5 million, is investing in European and US businesses
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 2003: Aliyev considers a Kazakh OSCE-Chairmanship in 2007 at a Permanent Council meeting; beginning to take legal actions against Internews Kazakhstan, Navigator and Assandi Times newspapers on charges of insulting his honour and dignity; the demanded amount of compensation varies from 5 to 10 million tenge

- 2004: Charges against Aliyev on using the name and a passport copy of Canadian businessman Adonis Derbas when creating money transfers from Kazakhstan to offshore zones; legal actions against Khorani family members
- 2005: Return to Kazakhstan, appointed Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister; he restores his influence at the special services, using compromising material from his time at the KNB; restoring his business empire and influence in the media; in order to combat opponents, he accumulates an arsenal of weapons and military equipment
- 2006: After the murder of the opposition politician A. Sarsenbayev, Aliyev has been accused by the KNB-Chairman Dutbayev for ordering the killing; Aliyev is suggesting to change the state system from Republic to a constitutional monarchy, headed by a Sultan
- 2007: Leaving Kazakhstan for a second term as Ambassador of the Republic of Kazakhstan in Austria; accusation regarding the Nurbank scandal, opening of a criminal case against him in Almaty, withdrawal of his credentials and his diplomatic immunity
- 2008: Aliyev was sentenced to a 20 year imprisonment in absentia for abduction; confiscation of his property in Kazakhstan

The Aliyev System



The Lebanon Connection

Khorani, Terrorism and Islamistic Fundamentalism in Kazakhstan

Aliyev's sister Gulzhat is married to the Lebanese citizen Khorani, son of one of the most influential individuals in the Lebanon and in the Palestine region.

When Aliyev was Deputy Director of the Kazakh KNB, Khorani got the permission to establish a construction company in Kazakhstan with the cooperation of an Italian businessman. With the help of KNB, the company started very soon to employ Arabic workers to an amount that was illegal under Kazakh law. Even though Kazakh officials had doubts about the legality of such actions, the authorities did not become active, mainly because Aliyev backed them. There is evidence that the relative of Aliyev personally was involved in bringing some engineers and workers into the country. After losing his post at the KNB and the accusations against Khorani and employees of his Kazakh company, he was directly fired by the directorate of the company and left together with his wife Kazakhstan and moved to London, where both still live.

Two dozens of those employees had direct links to terroristic movements, some of them with Al Qaida. All of them were trained by terror cells in special camps.

SSS Saypem

In June 2000 a contract has been signed with SSS Saypem, a Lebanese-Italian joint venture company for construction work in Karachaganak. The company's head became Issam Khorani, son of one of the most influential families in Lebanon and Palestine. Being a Lebanese citizen, he also received the Kazakh citizenship after the marriage with Aliyev's sister Gukzhat.

Soon after Aliyev lost his influential post at the KNB, Khorani also lost his position as the company's CEO in February 2002. The main reason for the board's decision was the fact that the company violated Kazakh law by employing foreign workers, incorrect working documents for those employees. 24 individuals, who received the working documents, have close links to Islamistic groups like Hizbollah, Moslem Brotherhood and even Al Qaida. They were sent to Kazakhstan, in order to build Islamistic centres in Central Asia,

supporting and training terroristic groups in Chechnya, all with the direct knowledge of SSS Saypem's CEO Khorani.

Our investigation came to the conclusion, that the Khorani family has close links to Hizbollah, even finances the organization. Seven workers for SSS Saypem in Kazakhstan were members of the Hizbollah; a mosque on the property of the company in Karachaganak was used by those individuals as a centre for spreading Islamic propaganda in word and publication. Many of those documents were printed there and sent illegally to Almaty and other centres in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.

In March 2002, workers for SSS Saypem were arrested in Honduras, accused of being members of a terroristic organization: Waari Bassem, born in Beirut, owner of a forged travel document (A 091756, passport of Honduras), in addition owner of a Palestine refugee passport (No. 1259, issued in Beirut); Saijed Yassim, owner of a forged Lebanese travel document and also a Palestine refugee passport (No. 078359). When arrested, they were accompanied by Issam Khorani, owner of a forged passport of Belize. After SSS Saypem's lawyer contacted officials in Honduras, all three were released, but had to leave the country immediately.

In December 2002 two high-ranking members of the „Moslem Brotherhood“ arrived in Kazakhstan with a flight from Beirut: Majdi Al-Taher and Mohammed Tohebes. Both men arrived in Kazakhstan for planning terroristic acts against US representation in the country and strengthening terror groups in Central Asia and Chechnya. Soon after the arrival of them, Abu Jussuf Al Hajel entered Kazakhstan and met both individuals several times. He used to be an active member of Al Qaida with direct and personal connections to Osama Bin Laden.

Other SSS Saypem workers were:

- ☉ Hussein Muhammad: Member of Hizbollah
- ☉ Raed Al-Behbe: Lebanese citizen, engineer for the company, organizing member of a Moslem Brotherhood cell in Kazakhstan, also registered under a different name (Raed Wahabi); specialist in building bombs and other explosives; he was one of the persons with direct contact with Al Qaida and Bin Laden during his stay in Kazakhstan

- ☉ Ahmed Al Hayati: Lebanese citizen, from the Palestine refugee camp Mia va Mia; member of Hizbollah, had during his stay in Kazakhstan direct contacts with terroristic cells in Chechnya
- ☉ Akram Musa Balkiz: from the Palestine refugee camp Ajn Al-Hilva; he was in Kazakhstan for collecting money for Chechen rebels
- ☉ Hussein Musa Svejdan: leading member of the security force of Hizbollah, Islamistic Jihad; according to our sources between 1999 and 2000 living in Paraguay, officially as a trader, formed Islamistic sleeper cells in the South American country; he also received explosive material from Iran
- ☉ Mahdi Taher Al-Taher: Lebanese citizen, from the Palestine camp Ajn Al-Hilva, high-ranking official of the Moslem Brotherhood, member of the group Asbat Al Ansar; close links to Islamistic extremists in the Central Asian region
- ☉ Fadel Yafawi: Lebanese citizen, worked as a manager for SSS Saypem; beside his work for Chechen terror cells, he was mainly responsible for Islamistic propaganda in the region of Almaty; in addition during his stay in Kazakhstan the contact person for Al Qaida; very dangerous
- ☉ Fadi Daud Ibrahim: Lebanese citizen, from the Palestine camp Nahr Al-Barid; leader of terroristic training camps in Kazakhstan; contacts with Bin Laden
- ☉ Nael Osman Lotfi: Lebanese citizens, studied medicine in Russia; one of the persons active in finding funds for Al Qaida
- ☉ Mohammed Yussuf Al-Avad: Lebanese citizen, member of Hizbollah and Abu Nidal; member of a group that killed Palestines in 1983 in Portugal; also connections with a terror act at a restaurant in Jerusalem in 1982
- ☉ Muhammad Shavkat: Citizen of India; before entering Kazakhstan, he was the ideological leader of an Islamistic propaganda group in Uralsk, Russia

The Novikova Case

Natalya Novikova, an anchor woman of Kazakh TV, for many years was the mistress of R. Aliyev. Though married legally with an employee of the Kazakh Embassy in Vienna, she was in constant contact with Aliyev.

In 2004, Novikova was found dead in Beirut, Lebanon, falling from a house's balcony where she stayed, the house was and is still owned by the Khorani family. Soon after the death, two men were arrested in connection with the death of Novikova, because they were seen in the house during the time of the incident: Vadim Koshlyakov and Kurman Akimkulov, both close allies of Aliyev. The post mortem of Natalya Novikova could not prove the involvement of a third person in her death, therefore the two suspects were released.

Directly after the incident, rumours arose that Aliyev was somehow related to the death. The post mortem could prove that she was pregnant when she died and people close to her revealed that Novikova already gave birth to a child sired by R. Aliyev and that she occasionally underlined that she was not satisfied with her status of being a mistress anymore and that she intended to inform Dariga Nazarbayeva, the wife of Aliyev, about the situation.

In addition, the legal husband of Novikova, a driver for the Kazakh Embassy in Vienna, also died under suspect circumstances during a car accident. He was a relative of Rakhat Aliyev, lived in a small village in Kazakhstan and was chosen by Aliyev to marry Novikova. The authors of this report will continue investigating the background of the suspicious accident.

Drugs

Soon after Mussayev became head of the Kazakh Secret Service in 1997, he and his close ally Aliyev started to control the drug traffic in Kazakhstan.

According to the Kazakh law, the Ministry of the Interior used to be the responsible body in the country regarding drug traffic. Since then, the KNB only dealt with small drug dealers and smugglers.

But after Mussayev's and Aliyev's take-over the KNB, they built up a special unit, that was under their direct control. This force directly began to increase its influence over the drug traffic and became the responsible body in Kazakhstan.

Between 1998 and 1999 the two „friends“ got total control over the drug traffic in the country. The main system was the following: The KNB received informations regarding the smuggling of drugs, mainly from Afghanistan through Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. When those drugs crossed the border to Kazakhstan, the special unit of the KNB caught those groups and arrested them without informing the Ministry of the Interior or the police; many of them also were killed by the forces, officially because they tried to flee. A reason to survive was the fact to be a former member of a secret service from the region, but only when they promised to work and cooperate with Aliyev and Mussayev in the future.

The confiscated drugs were not destroyed, but sold or exported to other countries through the KNB unit and also a special task force of the Fiscal Police, that was formed under the direct order of Aliyev. Those drug dealers, under the control of Mussayev and Aliyev became the leading drug dealers in the whole CIS-region, with the exception of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.

There are proofs that the new leaders of drug traffic with this system „caught“ about 1-2 tons of drugs per month, mainly Marihuana and raw, cleaned opiates, which was brought to a special KNB storage, where only the „special“ groups were allowed to enter. This all happened without any knowledge of the official Kazakh authorities.

Another connection was created together with the son of the Turkmen President, Marat Niyazov. Aliyev already knew him in the 80's during university times in Moscow. After becoming KNB director, Aliyev traveled several times to Ashkhabad, officially to tighten the relations between the Kazakh KNB and the Turkmen MNB concerning the drug traffic.

At this time, Marat Niyazov together with the Director of the Presidential Guard Rejepov, one of the most influential persons those days in Turkmenistan, built up a monopolistic tobacco business in Turkmenistan; he imported tax-free tobacco to Turkmenistan, mainly from Turkey, Russia, Emirates and Afghanistan. The tobacco then was sold illegally in Turkmenistan and was exported to other countries in Central Asia. At that time, General Rejepov was also one of the leading drug dealers in Turkmenistan, importing raw opiates from Afghanistan to Turkmenistan.

Our sources report that Marat Niyazov and Aliyev made a verbal agreement to cooperate closer in the drug traffic. With the direct support of General Rejepov, the imported Afghan opiates through Turkmenistan to Kazakhstan. They used mainly tobacco boxes from the other business of Turkmenbashi junior, put heroine into it and shipped the packages via the Caspian Sea to a Kazakh harbour. There, the people of Aliyev picked up the delivery. The tobacco went on sale in Kazakhstan, the drugs went to Aliyev's dealers.

Aliyev and Mussayev used this system for about two years. When some information leaks became obvious, they decided to reduce their direct involvement in the business, many individuals, who could have been the leak, were killed. In addition, during the drug business of Mussayev and Aliyev the Russian officials, fighting against drug traffic, never received any substantial informations from Kazakh authorities regarding the drug traffic to Russia, like they did before 1997 (and after 2001). No substantial numbers of drugs could be confiscated by Russian authorities during this period of time, no drug dealers could have been arrested, mainly because they were killed or fled, according to informations, the Kazakh KNB gave to the Russian authorities. Also, the Russians received reliable informations that between 1999 and 2000 an increasing number of KNB and Ministerial officials in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, responsible for drug traffic, were killed under suspicious circumstances. According to our sources, the Russian authorities in this respect have made a direct linkage to Mussayev and Aliyev regarding the control over the drug traffic during this period.

The main reason for Mussayev and Aliyev stepping back from their active role in the drug traffic business was 2001, when they lost their post at the KNB. Both men decided that this could be the first step for the authorities in Kazakhstan to build up a case against them. Therefore they decided to bring documents out of the country, mainly through diplomatic channels, as Aliyev became Ambassador in Austria, Vienna.

Most of the money from selling drugs went to private bank accounts of Mussayev and Aliyev in Switzerland and Luxembourg. They decided not to use US- and offshore accounts, because they were scared to face investigation by the FBI.

Serik Matyshev was at that time one of the leading financial advisors for Mussayev and Aliyev, transferring the money out of the country; Matyshev used to be the head of a criminal organization in the Almaty region, helping Aliyev in illegal taking-overs of businesses in Kazakhstan. The other person was M. Abuov, who laundered the money from the drug business through his Kazakh companies Munaj Impeks and Almaty Trade and Finance Bank.

Even before the first accusations started against Mussayev and Aliyev in Kazakhstan, both men contacted Western intelligence services, especially the Austrian BVT in 2006. Beside informations regarding security, military and other „state secrets“ of Central Asia and Russia, Mussayev and Aliyev tried to convince the Austrian officials of being active fighters against the drug traffic. Therefore, they passed over some informations regarding economic and business connections of drug dealers in Central Asia and Europe, and how heroine was smuggled to the West.

In addition, Interpol authorities already got some informations regarding the direct influence of Mussayev and Aliyev in the international drug traffic. Reliable sources also report that the Austrian authorities were informed about the fact that drugs were sent to Western Europe through diplomatic post of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. In addition, there are informations that the Austrian BVT and Israeli Mossad were able to open a diplomatic parcel filled with pure heroine, directly sent by Aliyev, when he was Ambassador of the Republic of Kazakhstan to Austria. Our sources say that BVT used this information as a kind of pressure against Aliyev, in order to cooperate closer with the European intelligence.

Weapons and Arms

When Aliyev and Mussayev founded their personal forces inside the KNB and the Fiscal Police, Aliyev ordered pistols and guns for them, without informing the responsible ministries in Kazakhstan. Our sources report that those arms came through illegal channels from Tajikistan, where the weapons were imported from Afghanistan. Beside automatic guns, heavy weapons, bazookas, grenade launchers came to those forces. Beside this illegal import of arms and weapons, Aliyev as Deputy Chief of the KNB ordered officially pistols and assault rifles mainly in Austria; those requests came through official channels within the KNB.

Experts, who were interviewed by us said that the illegal arms were used by the Aliyev forces for criminal actions, related with drug traffic, elimination of drug dealers, supporting the „Black Raider“ system of Aliyev.

There are even links to the murders of A. Sarsenbayev and his assistants. In 2006 Sarsenbayev personally accused Aliyev of criminal takeover of businesses and abuse of power, followed by a trial against him, initiated by Aliyev.

Some sources reported that Sarsenbayev as opposition leader was under surveillance of a KNB branch, that was not under the influence of Aliyev and Mussayev. All his steps were monitored and even video-taped. On the day of the killing, the responsible KNB-officer taped a meeting of Sarsenbayev with Aliyev outside of Almaty, both met and disappeared, one hour later the killed bodies were found. The video tape disappeared and the KNB-officer was never seen again.

Another evidence was found during the investigations of the Nurbank scandal: At a property in Almaty, officially used by a kindergarden, eye witnesses reported that some of the missing managers of the bank were brought to this area. When police and Ministry officials investigated the real owner of the building, they could not find any owner entry in the property documents of the Almaty City Property List. A request for a property search was finally granted by the General Prosecutor's office and the police could enter the building.

There, no signs of a kindergarden could be found. Instead, the house included a big but empty store room, where specialists investigated that this room was used as a storage for arms and weapons. Traces of munition and explosives were found. When questioninn

neighbours of the building again, the witnesses reported that huge wooden boxes were loaded onto lorries a couple of nights before the search and the people, who unloaded the content were identified as members of the special Fiscal Police Force. It could be assumed, that those boxes were filled with arms and weapons.

In addition, a locked cellar complex was found in the building. In this complex, police and officials of the General Prosecutor's office found little blood samples and video tapes with a quite interesting content: instructions how to interrogate individuals. It could be proved that the video was taped in Chechnya with real persons, who interrogated and tortured a victim. Also, propaganda material could be recovered, mainly focussing on Islamistic and terroristic propaganda. In another room of the cellar, evidence could be collected that the room was used as a martial arts training room.

Therefore, it seems that the property in Almaty was used by the Special Forces of Aliyev as a deposit, that the cellar was used for the training and the execution of interrogation, combined with torture. It also can be assumed that employees of SSS Saypem also used the building as a storage of Islamistic material and as a training building.

The West

As already mentioned, Aliyev built up close relations with Western intelligence even before he became persona non grata in Kazakhstan, mainly because he knew beforehand that his situation could become critical in his country.

Together with Mussayev he brought some sensitive documents to Vienna, when he became Ambassador the first time in Austria, primarily to have compromising material available, if something happens.

One proved meeting between Aliyev and Western secret services took place in March 2009 in Vienna, it lasted for about three hours and present was Juergen Zech, BVT member and former assistant to Minister Strasser, Jochen K., also BVT and Jeremy Brown, MI 6. The participants discussed mainly the political situation in Kazakhstan, about the political elite, possible crisis within the ruling elite and about perspectives, if the current leadership could crash. Especially the BVT representatives tried to figure out how a future cooperation with Aliyev could be defined and how the critical situation regarding the Western media and the position of the new Austrian Government could be combined with the interests of the Austrian intelligence service and the guarantees, BVT gave Aliyev. Of course, the bilateral relations between Austria and Kazakhstan also had to be considered. The main reason for this new situation was the fact, that the new Administration in Vienna, especially the Ministries of the Interior and Justice began to have a different approach towards Aliyev than the Government before.

After the collapse of the Austrian Government 2008 under Chancellor Gusenbauer and the early elections with a new government the new political leadership at the Danube would like to reassess the case of R. Aliyev, who was convicted in absentia in 2007 for a long-term sentence by a Kazakh Court of a variety of charges, including kidnapping and foundation of a criminal organization. Although Kazakh authorities asked for the extradition of the former Kazakh Ambassador in Austria in 2007, a Vienna court turned down Astana's extradition request for Aliyev, saying he could not expect a fair Kazakh trial. Meanwhile, authorities in Vienna were still discussing the possibility of bringing action against the former son-in-law of the Kazakh President under Austrian law.

Already in the past it became clear that the presence of Aliyev in Austria caused political pain in Vienna. On the one hand time and again news became public concerning the possible participation of Aliyev in criminal actions, on the other hand the bilateral relations

between Austria and Kazakhstan suffered, especially as Austria plays an important role in the EU Nabucco project and also in other energy projects between the European Union and Central Asia.

The starting point was made by the new Parliament in Vienna when MP's wrote a questionnaire to the Government concerning the legal and political background of A. Mussayev, former Director of the Kazakh Secret Service KNB and close ally of Aliyev, who served as Deputy Chief of the KNB. Mussayev, living in Vienna as well, was also convicted in absentia in 2007, during the same trial which brought Aliyev into trouble.

According to Austrian information sources, which were passed over to ETG, on December 12 high-level officials, representing the Austrian Ministries of the Interior, Justice and Foreign Relations met for the discussion of a solution in the Aliyev case. The new direction of the Foreign and Justice Ministry already formed the opinion that the presence of Aliyev in Austria would mean more damage than benefit for the country. As well, the ETG sources state that the best solution for the Austrian Government would be a voluntary decision by Aliyev leaving Austria to a third country.

During the meeting with BVT and MI 6 this year, Aliyev positioned himself during this conversation as a still powerful political figure of Kazakhstan, who in fact has intensive influence through his personal network at the Kazakh Administration, with permanent contacts in the political elite of the country. He also underlined the fact that his powerful allies in Astana already finalized a concept for a possible return and a judicial rehabilitation for Aliyev and Mussayev. He also underlined the fact that latest at the beginning of 2010 the West can expect immense political changes in Kazakhstan. During the conversation, BVT and MI 6 also tried to verify, if Aliyev's political power and influence is still active in Kazakhstan.

The Judge

Peter Seda was from the beginning the responsible Austrian judge, dealing with the whole Aliyev case.

Seda in general is a direct link between the security department of the Austrian Ministry of the Interior and several Western intelligence services. As a judge, he is focusing his work on cases with a strong political motivation.

According to reliable sources in Austria and Europe, Judge Seda has close contacts with the Israeli intelligence, mainly Mossad. He was and is a close ally of all directors of Nativ in Austria, an Israeli intelligence agency that used to be integrated in Mossad in the past.

According to our sources, Peter Seda is a very influential person within the Austrian politics and justice, and it is said that he is able to put pressure on the legislative and executive bodies within the Austrian authorities regarding political cases.

Since the extradition request by Kazakh authorities regarding Aliyev and Mussayev, Seda was the responsible judge. In addition, he was present at most of the meetings between Aliyev, Mussayev and Western intelligence and reviewed all documents that were handed over by the Kazakh refugees to BVT, related to security issues in Kazakhstan and Central Asia, the political stability in the country, etc. Also, BVT collected all dossiers on Kazakh political figures for the last decade, conducted by Seda and reviewed by Aliyev and Mussayev; it of course has to be questioned, how this work of Seda can fit into his professional role as an independent judge, being responsible for the legal aspects of the Aliyev case.

Our sources in Vienna also report that the Ministry of the Interior has collected a file on Peter Seda, mainly focussing on his cooperation with the Israeli Secret Service: This file says, that Seda is paid by Mossad as an informal employee, paid through an Israeli bank in Geneva; the dossier should also include evidence that Seda bought two properties, one in Switzerland and one in St. Poelten, Austria, with the money, he received from this bank account in Geneva.